Four High Court cases
The extent of IPSEA’s support to parents can vary from a single phone call to long-term support and representation over a number of years.
Occasionally cases arise where IPSEA’s involvement continues to the level of legal action. Often subsequent court judgements provide legal precedents which clarify and improve the law for all children with special educational needs.
On this page we feature four such cases from our files.
Andrew
The statement must specify provision: an indication of funding alone is not enough
Andrew’s statement failed to specify an amount of speech therapy but referred to ‘extra funding at band Level 3 ... £6,000.’ Professional advice indicated that Andrew needed three hours of speech therapy a week and that £6,000 could not pay for this. Andrew’s father appealed to the High Court on the grounds that the statement limited the LEA’s ability to make the provision Andrew needed. The court ruled that although it was not illegal for an LEA to refer to a ‘funding band’ or an amount of money, this on its own did not fulfil their duty in law to “specify” the provision a child should receive in a statement. Cumbria was ordered by the court to rewrite Andrew’s statement to make it clear to his father “what the authority consider (his) son ought to receive.”
This judgement, known as R v Cumbria County Council ex parte P 1994, is now quoted by parents when LEAs refer to a band or level of support or a sum of money to be made available in a statement instead of specifying the actual provision a child should receive.
Parent’s comments
“IPSEA was my only support as I battled to secure provision for Andrew, before and during the court action. I was delighted that the result of all our hard work was a ruling that benefits all children with statements.”
Niki
When parents choose a mainstream place, LEAs cannot use cost alone as a reason for denying it. They must weigh the additional cost against the parents’ preference
Niki’s parents wanted him to attend a mainstream school, but their LEA refused. The Tribunal upheld the LEA’s decision, and Niki’s parents appealed to the High Court. Although the court upheld the Tribunal, it did rule that when considering whether a mainstream placement for a child with special educational needs represented an ‘inefficient use of resources’, an LEA must go further than simply calculating the additional cost involved (if any). “One has to look at the figures, decide whether there is an additional cost, and then do a balancing exercise weighing the additional cost against the parents’ preference.”
This judgement, known as R v Lancashire County Council ex parte Crane 1997, is now quoted by parents when LEAs deny children places in mainstream schools on the grounds of cost.
Parents’ comments
“Most people understand the need for equal rights regardless of race, gender or disability but parents of disabled children find it harder than most to secure their children’s rights. That is why IPSEA is so important, providing free advice and support for parents at all stages from classroom to the High Court.”
Sam
LEAs can share the cost of provision with schools by agreement, but must bear the whole cost if the school were to end the arrangement
Sam’s statement gave him 20 hours of support in a mainstream primary school. The LEA informed the school that they would have to pay for 5 hours of this from their own funds. Sam’s parents thought this would jeopardise his chance of being accepted by a mainstream secondary school when the time came to transfer and so appealed to the High Court. The court ruled that it was not illegal for an LEA to come to this arrangement provided the school agreed. “But if ... the school were to ... say that they were no longer prepared to apply any part of their budget to the cost of the 20 hours ... the (LEA) would immediately have to meet the full cost. The provision would in any event be secure.”
This judgement, known as R v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte P 1995, is now quoted by parents when LEAs try to make schools pay for some of the provision specified in Part 3 of a statement.
Parents’ comments
“We were at our wits end. We could not have pursued the legal route without IPSEA’s help. We are a low-income family and could not afford legal advice. IPSEA’s practical and emotional support was excellent. Here was a group with no hidden agenda who were supporting us 100%. They gave us the strength to carry on.”
George
Transport must be non-stressful
The transport arrangements made by the LEA to get George to school involved him spending upwards of three hours a day in a bus. His parents appealed to the High Court. The Court ruled: “... the LEA is under a duty to make such arrangements as it considers necessary for a child to reach school without undue stress, strain or difficulty such as would prevent him from benefiting from the education the school has to offer...It follows that where a child with special educational needs requires transport to get him to school the transport which the LEA proposes to make available must therefore be non-stressful transport...”
This judgement, known as R v Hereford and Worcester County Council ex parte P 1992, is now quoted by parents when LEAs’ transport arrangements result in children with special educational needs spending unreasonable periods of time being bussed or taxied to and from school.
Parents’ comments
“If it were not for IPSEA’s help we would still be struggling. The fact that we could rely on the expertise of such knowledgeable and sympathetic people removed a lot of the pressure from an upsetting experience. We will always be indebted to IPSEA....”
